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Deterministic and randomized solutions are developed for the problem of equitably distributing
m indivisible objects to n people (whose values may differ), without the use of outside judges or
side-payments. Several general bounds for the minimal share are found; a practical method is
given for determining an optimal lottery and the largest minimal share; and the case of repeated
allocations is analyzed.
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1. Introduction

Suppose m indivisible objects (or tasks) must be distributed to n people whose
relative and total values of the objects may differ, as is often the case in estate settle
ments or committee assignments. Is it possible to distribute the objects in such a way
that each person receives what he considers a fair share, or in some other 'optimal'
way?
Classical solutions of such problems usually involve seIling the objects and dis
tributing the money, employment of an outside judge or assessor, or use of side-pay
ments (see e.g., Steinhaus, 1948, 1949, 1960; and Dubins, 1977). SeIling the objects
and distributing the money, however, essentially ignores both the individual values
of the participants and the indivisibility of the objects (which are in effect replaced
by the single completely-divisible object 'money'); employment of an outside judge
or assessor introduces a new value judgement not inherent in the original problem
and often not closely related to the original participants' values; and use of side
payments assumes the existence of a new completely-divisible object (money), also
not inherent in the original problem and which often is not available (in sufficient
quantity) to all the participants. The objective of this paper is to study several solu
tions of the distribution problem which stay within the framework of the original

problem, that is, which do not employ outside judges or side-payments.
It is assumed that each participant is to share equally in the estate, and that each
of the values of the participants is known (i.e., there is complete information) and
is normalized with total value unity, so that the entire problem in the case of n peo
ple and m objects is completely described by a single n x m row stochastic matrix
A = (au)' where au represents the value of the jth object to the ith person.
The assumption of normalization to unity simply reflects the use of relative (as
opposed to absolute) values of the objects in determining utilities. In other contexts,
such as those where side-payments or arbitration are allowed (see e.g., Kalai, 1985;
or Steinhaus, 1960), absolute values of the objects may well be important in deter
mining the solution or side-payment. But when no side-payments or arbitration are
allowed, relative values of the objects seems ro be the only important facror. If a
participant considers a particular collection of objects to be worth exactly one-third
the total estate, then he values this collection equally to any other collection worth
exactly one-third to him, and values it more than any collection he feels is worth
strictly less than one-third, regardless of the absolute values of each of the objects.
(This is equivalent to an assumption of 'individual scale-invariance ,, where for con
venience all total values are simply rescaled or renormalized to unity.)
It should be emphasized that the treatment of the distribution problem in this
paper is measure-theoretic and probabilistic, not game theoretic or economic, and
notions such as use of coalitions, bargaining or deception are not addressed. The
objective studied here is to maximize the minimum share received by the partici
pants, and a solution which is optimal in this sense is clearly Pareto optimal (e.g .•
see Kalai, 1985). When risks or lotteries are involved, an expected-value criterion
assuming risk neutrality is used.
Example 1. (Several value-matrices for n = m = 2.)
A -

0.7 0.3) .

) - ( 0.4 0.6 •

A 2-

0.7 0.3) .
( 0.7 0.3 •

A 3 -_ (0.7 0.3) •
0.6 0.4

For A). an obvious solution is to give (deterministically) object 1 to person 1 and
object 2 to person 2; this certainly guarantees that each participant receives at least
half the value of the total estate according to his own preferences. For A 2 • no such
deterministic solution is fair since one of the two participants must receive a share
he considers 50.3. but an obvious randomized solution is to toss a fair coin and
give object 1 to person 1 and object 2 to person 2 if the coin shows 'heads' (and
vice versa otherwise); this guarantees each person at least 0.3 of the estate. and an
expected share of half the estate. For A 3 • the coin-tossing solution is also fair, but
an optimal randomized solution (see Example 4.3 below) is to give object 2 to person
2 deterministicallY, and also give object 1 to person 2 with probability fi, yielding
an expected share of i3 to each person.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains an analysis of deterministic
solutions including a proof of the NP-completeness of the problem of deciding the

existence of fair deterministic distributions, and a lower bound on the largest pos
sible minimal share as a function of the maximum entry of the value matrix; Section
3 introduces the notion of randomized solutions and proves the existence of optimal
'fair' and 'independent' lotleries; Section 4 contains methods for practical calcula
tion of optimallotleries and minimal shares (essentially by reduction to a linear pro
gramming problem) and identifies some general bounds for optimal randomized
distributions; and Section 5 contains an analysis of the problem of repeated (or
periodic) distribution of the same objects to the same people over time.

2. Deterministic solutions
Throughout this paper Sn,m is the set of n x m row stochastic matrices and D n. m
is the subset of Sn.m consisting of matrices whose only entries are 0 or 1. (M)ij is
the ijth entry of the matrix M.
Definition 2.1. The deterministic-distribution value of A e Sn.m' Vo(A), is given by
VD(A)

= max

rmin (AQ)ii: QeDm,n 1.J
l/sn

(That is. if the objective is to distribute the objects deterministically so as to make
the minimum share as large as possible, V D(A) is the largest possible minimum
share.)
The problem of deciding whether a given problem (matrix) has a deterministic
'fair' solution (i.e., one with Vo(A) ~ lin) may be computationally intractable. It
is at least NP-complete as is now demonstrated (so there is no known polynomial
(in the variables n, m) time algorithm which will decide if there is a fair solution).
Consider the subclass of problems which involve only 2 people who assign the
same rational values to each object. That is. (A)lj = (Ahj = Pj IN for some integers
Pj' N, with ~ Pj = N. If there are m objects, there will be a fair deterministic solu
tion if and only if there is a subset S~ {1.2 .... ,m} with ~jesPj= ~jESPj. The
problem of determining if there is such a subset is the partition problem - one of
the six basic NP-complete problems of Garey and Johnson (1979). This proves the
following result.
Theorem 2.2. The problem of determining whether fair deterministic solutions exist
(i.e., whether Vo(A) ~ lin) is at least NP-complete.
On the other hand, for the class of problems described above it is not hard to con
struct random distributions which are fair in the sense that each person's expected
share is 0.5. Consider the case n = 2 where each person assigns the same values to
m ~ 2 objects; then at least m -1 of them can be distributed deterministically. For
the 2 person case, let the values of the objects be UI ::5 U2::5 ... ::5 Um' Distribute the

objects one at a time as follows: person 1 gets VI' /)3' ..• , person 2 gets V~, V-t, .• "
and stop distributing when one person would have more than 0.5 on his next turn.
This implies vI+v3+ ... +v1k_ISO.5 and either V1+",+v~k-2S0.5 or
v~ + ,.. + VZk S 0.5 with the next allocation being the one that would raise one of the
person's share to more than 0.5. The claim is that there is only one object remaining.
For if at least two objects remained, their values, Vj S Vj+ I'" S V m ' would raise
both parties' worth to more than -} contradicting the assumption that
v I + ... + V m = 1. It is then easy to arrange a lottery for the one remaining object
that will insure both parties of an expected value of 0.5. A short calculation shows
that if person I has a share of a and person 2 has a share of p after all m - I pieces
have been distributed, then assigning the mth piece to person 1 with probability
(P - a + v m )l2v m gives each person an expected share of 0.5.
The next theorem gives a sharp lower bound for the largest possible minimum
share Vo(A) as a function of the number of people and the largest entry of A.
Definition 2.3. (Hill, 1987a). Vn : [0, 1) - [0, n - I] is the unique non-increasing
function satisfying
Vn(a) = l-k(n-I)a
for a e [(k+ l)[k«k+ l)n -1)] -I, (kn-l)-I]
for all k

~

1.

= (aij) e Sn,m satisfies aij S a for a/l is nand j S m, then
Vo(A) ~ Vn(a). Moreover, this bound is sharp; for each n ~ 1 and a e(O, 1] there
is an m ~ 1 and an A e Sn,m with aij S a for a/l i and j, and Vo(A) = Vn(a).

Theorem 2.4. If A

Proof. The first part of the conclusion is a special case of the following theorem
of Hill (l987a). If J.l It ••• , J.l n are probability measures on the same measurable space
(X, g;"), and if J.li(A) S a for each J.li-atom A and each i, then there is a measurable
partition {B;}7= I of X so that J.li(B i ) ~ Vn(a) for all i = 1, ... , n. That the bound is
attained for all n ~ 1 and all a e (0,1] is seen by the following analog of an example
of Hill (l987a). Fix a>O, let k be such that ae[(k+l)[k«k+l)n-l)]-I,
(kn - 1)-1], and let m = kn and A e Sn.m be the matrix given by aij = a for all i So n
and all j < m, and aim = 1 - a(m - 1) for all is n. It is easy to check that
Vo (A)=l-k(n-l)a..

0

Example 2.5. Three people must divide an estate of m objects, none of which is
valued at more than 10070 of the total estate by any person. Then there is always a
way of assigning objects to people so that each person receives a share he values at
least V3 (ro) = fi of the total estate, and in general it is not possible to do better.
3. Randomized solutions
The purpose of this section is to introduce and investigate the notion of distribut

ing m indivisible objects to n people randomly, for example through the use of a
lottery. Such solutions in general may (with positive probability) assign none of the
objects to a particular person; however, it is the expected share of each participant
that is compared, the tacit assumption being that a person is risk neutral, e.g., each
person would value equally a lump sum of $500 and a 'fifty-fifty' chance at $1000
(with probability t he wins $1000, and with equal probability he wins nothing),
and would prefer either of these over any option with expected value strictly less
than $500. Problems of risk-averting or risk-seeking values (or nonlinear utilities)
are not addressed in this paper.
Definition 3.1. A lottery Lon (n,m) is a probability measure on D m
ability person i' gets object j' under lottery L, P L (j' -- i'), is
Pdj'--i')

= L {~'i"

n'

(The prob

L(D):

The set of all lotteries on (n, m) will be denoted by P(n, m).
Example 3.2. (a) Roll an On-die' once; if 'i' shows, then person i gets all m objects.
This corresponds to the lottery LIE P(n, m) with L, (D) = I In if D has one column
all I' s, and L, (D) = 0 otherwise.
(b) Roll an 'n-die' m times (independently); if 'i' shows on thejth roll, then per
son i gets object j. This corresponds to the lottery L 2 with L 2 (D) = n -m for all

DED m

n'

(c) Flip a coin once; if 'head' shows, person 1 gets all m objects, otherwise person
2 gets all m objects. This corresponds to the lottery L 3 with L 3 (D 1 )=L 3 (D 2 )=t,
where D, is the stochastic matrix with first column identically 1, and D 2 with the
second column identically 1.
Definition 3.3. The A-value to person i of lottery L, V(A,L,i), is
m

V(A, L, i)

= L aijPL (j -- i);
)=,

the (minimum) A-value of lottery L, V(A,L), is

V(A,L)

= min

V(A,L,i); and

i:s n

the randomized value of A, VR(A), is

VR(A)

= sup{ V(A,L): L E

P(n,m)}.

Example 3.4.
(a) Let L"L 2 ,L 3 be as in Example 3.2. Then for all A E5 nm :

V(A,Lt>i)

= V(A,L 2 ,i) = lin

V(A,L 1)

for all

= V(A,L 2 ) = lin;

i~n

and

and
V(A,L 3 , 1)

= V(A,L 3 ,2) = 1- and

V(A,L 3 ,i) = V(A,L 3 ) =0 for all i>2 if n>2.
(b)

VR

(~ ~) == 1;

VR

(~ ~) == 1-.

Definition 3.5. Lottery L is independent if
r

Pdh-i k for all k
for all

= 1, ... ,r) = II

r~m,

Pdjk-ik)

k= \

all subsets {j\,

and all ike {l, ... , n}, k == 1,

,jr} of {l, ... ,m},
, r;

otherwise L is dependent.
(Intuitively, an independent lottery is one in which there is a separate (and in
dependent) sublottery for each object.)
Example 3.6. Let L\,L 2 ,L 3 be as in Example 3.2. Then L I is dependent, L 2 is in
dependent, and L 3 is dependent.
Theorem 3.7. Independent lotteries suffice. That is, for all A eSn,m there is a
QeSm,n with

Proof. That the supremum is attained by some lottery L * follows easily from the
compactness of the space of probabilities on the finite set D m • n and the continuity
in A of VR(A). Let QeSm,n denote the independent lottery defined by qij=
PLoU - i) for I ~ j ~ m, 1 ~ i ~ n. Then V(A,L *,i) == r.J= \aijPL"U - i) == J= I
aijqji = (AQh = V(A, Q, i).
0

r.

Definition 3.8. Lottery L is fair for A if V(A,L) ~ lin, and is optimal for A if
V(A,L) = VR(A).
Example 3.9. Lotteries L 1 and L 2 of Example 3.2 are fair for all A, and optimal
for A 2 of Example 1 but not for A \ or A 3' Lottery L 3 is neither fair nor optimal
for any A if n > 2.
Proposition 3.10. Optimal lotteries always exist, and optimal lotteries are always
fair.
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 3.7 and Example 3.4(a}.

0

Proposition 3.lt. Let A

E

Sn m' Then the sets of

(i) fair independent lotteries

and
(ii) optimal independent lotteries

are non-empty closed convex subsets of Sm.n'
Proof.
(i) The independent lottery Q with entries identically 1/ n is fair. To see the set
of fair independent lotteries is convex, fix two such lotteries Q and Q', and fix
t E [0, 1]. Then
(A(tQ + (1- t)Q'»ii == (tAQ+ (1- t)AQ')ii
== t(AQ)ii + (1 - t)(AQ'Li

I

1

I

n

n

n

~t·-+(l-t)-==-,

(where the inequality follows from the assumed fairness of Q and Q'), so
tQ + (1 - t)Q' is fair.
The set is closed since if {Qk} k= 1 are fair and Qk --+ Q (convergence entrywise),
then it easily follows that Q E Sm.n and that Q is fair.
(ii) The existence of an optimal independent lottery Q* follows from Theorem
3.7; convexity follows essentially as in (i), replacing lin by V(A, Q*); and closedness
0
also follows also as in (i).
If m == 1, the fair lottery is unique (trivially); conversely, if m> I the set of fair
lotteries is never a singleton, as is seen by L 1 and L 2 of Example 3.2.
Example 3.12. Let n == m == 2 and A
VR(A) == 1.

= (~ ?).

Then the optimal lottery is unique, and

Remark. For the case n =2, Crawford and Heller (1979) give a randomized version
of the well-known 'divide-and-choose' solution.

4. Calculation of optimal lotteries and shares
The main purpose of this section is to give equivalent characterizations for V R
which enable both the value VR(A) and an optimal independent lottery Q to be
easily calculated. First observe that by Theorem 3.7
VR(A) == max{ V(A, Q): Q ESm,n}'

Definition 4.1. For A E Sn.m'
The game-theoretic value of A, VG(A), is

(Note: This is not the same as the value of a two-person game with payoff matrix A.)
The linear-programming value of A, VlP(A), is the solution of the linear pro
gramming problem
max

z

s.t.:

z=Laijq)i

1/1

i=I, ... ,n;

)=1

q);~O

for all i=l, ... ,n andj=I, ... ,m; and

n

L

qj;= 1 for allj=l, ... ,m.

i= I

The value VG is technically easier to compute than V R, since VG entails minimiz
ing over an n-dimensional probability vector whereas VR is maximizing over n x m
stochastic matrices. Calculations for both VR and VG are, at least superficially,
nonlinear; the next theorem, however, shows that they may be reduced to a standard
linear programming problem and thus easily solved using LP techniques such as the
simplex algorithm.

Theorem 4.2. For all A

E

Sn,m

Proof. Fix A E Sn.m' The equality' VR(A) = VG(A)' will be proved from a result of
Dar (1975) which may be stated as follows:
If II> ... , In are non-negative Borel functions on (0, m], then
min [

\~m (~axPili) :Pi ~ 0,

,,0

Isn

.t 1)
Pi =

= max [min \

1=1

is a measurable partition of (0, m]

1

Ii:

{Bi}j

L·Bi

J.

(1)

To see how (1) implies VR(A) = VG(A), let/l, ... ,ln~O be the simple functions
on (0, m] given by
on (j - 1, j]

forj=l, ... ,m,

and for a partition {B;}I' of (O,m], let
qji = ()'(B j » -1 )'(B i n (j - 1, j

D,

where). is Lebesque measure. Observe that

Q = (qj;) eSm,n'

i=I, ... ,n,

The conclusion VR(A)
and VG since
'm

\
,,0

= VG(A)
m

maxpJi
Isn

and

then follows from (I) and the definitions of VR

.'j

III

=L \

maxpJi

)=1 .j_1 Isn

m)

1

maxPiaij

)=llsn

m

\ /; =L \
.
J = 1 "B, n U -

~ B,

=L

. fi
I. J J

= .~

aijqji'

J- I

'VR(A)= VLP(A)'. This will follow once it is shown that

r

max min (AQ)ii: Q

E

Sm.n

(Isn

and (AQ)II

= (AQ)ii

1J = max{(AQ)11 : Q E Sm.n
(2)

for all i:5n}.

Proof of (2). '~' is clear since the left-hand-side involves maximizing over a larger
set. For' :5', fix Q*ES m. n so that V(A,Q*)= VR(A), and without loss of generality
assume (AQ*) 11 = VR(A). If (AQ*)ii = VR(A) for all i:5 n, the conclusion follows. If
(AQ*)ii> VR(A), decrease q}(i.e., decrease P(j-+i)) for j such that q}>O and in
crease qj~" for those same j and i' with (AQ*)i'i' = VR(A), (keeping the row sums
equal to 1) in such a way as to decrease (AQ*)ii to VR(A), while insuring that the
new lottery Q* satisfies (AQ*)i7= VR(A) for all with (AQ*);/"= VR(A). Continue
until the new lottery Q satisfies (AQ)II = ... =(AQ)nn. This completes the proof of

r

(2).

0

(Alternatively, the first equality in Theorem 4.2 can be proved using the basic
minimax theorem of game theory, and the second equality using linear program
ming duality.)

Example 4.3. Let A 3 be as in Example 1. By Theorem 4.2, VR(A 3) is the solution
of
max.

Z

s.t.:

Z

= O. 7qll + 0.3q21 = 0.6ql2 + 0.4qZ2;

Easy calculations show the optimal lottery Q = (q ij) is

-10

3
-

13 13

Q=

o

7 6
--13 13

6 7
-13 13

so
V R (A 3 ) ==

D'

This last example also shows that lotteries which guarantee that each participant
receive at least one object (interesting only in the case m ~ n) are sometimes strictly
sub-optimal; the optimal Q for A 3 gives both objects to person 2 with probability
fi, and it is easily seen that any lottery which guarantees each person an object is
strictly sub-optimal.
Recall that by Theorem 3.10, VR(A) ~ lin for all A E Sn,m' The next theorem
implies that superjair (i.e., VR(A) > lin) lotteries exist precisely when not all par
ticipants' values agree, and gives sharp bounds for the superfairness based on the
'cooperative' value of the m objects to the n people (i.e., the value obtained if each
object is given to a person who values it most, and these values are then summed),
and the analogous minimal value, i.e., the value obtained if each object is given to
a person who values it least, and these values are summed.
Theorem 4.4. Let AeSn,m' a== IJ=lmaxjS/l{aij}, and P== EJ=lminjsn {aij}'
Then
(i) VR(A)~(n-a+ I)-I; and
(ii) VR(A)~(n-1 +p)-l,
and these bounds are sharp.

Proof. The conclusion follows, as in the proof of Theorem 4.2, from the following
results of Elton, Hill and Kertz (1986) and Hill (1987b): If Ill> ... ,Il n are non
atomic probability measures on (X, 87), then sup{minjsnllj(BJ: {Bdl is a measur
able partition of X}~(n-a+l)-I, and ~(n-I+p)-I, where a==sup{l:i=1
J.lj(B j): {Bj}l is a measurable partition of X} and p== inf{ E i= Illj(B j): {Bj}l is a
measurable partition of X}.
0
Corollary 4.5. VR(A) > lin

<:>

rank A> 1.

Proof. Apply Theorem 4.4, observing that M> 1 <:> rank A > 1.

::J

(A direct proof of Corollary 4.5 is also possible using redistribution of mass
arguments.)
Example 4.6. Let A 3 be as in Example 1, so n==2 and a= 1.1, P==O.9. Then the
bound given by Theorem 4.4 (both (i) and (ii» is VR(A3)~~::::O.5263. (Recall,
from Example 4.3, that VR(A3)==f5::::0.5385.)
As was stated earlier, the model in this paper assumes each person's true values
are known. If one player knows another's values, and that the lotterized solution
will be used, he may increase his expected payoff by disguising his preferences, as
the next example shows. (One way of guarding against this is to have each player

submit sealed preferences.)
Example 4.7. Suppose At represents true preferences, so VR(A1)=:iJ. If however,
player 2 changes stated preferences to those in A 3' then player 2 receives object 2
with probability 1 and object 1 with probability h for an expected true payoff of
ft. (In fact, player 2 should state a preference of 0.7-c for object 1 and 0.3 + c for
object 2 in order to nearly maximize his expected payoff.)

5. Replication of randomized allocations
In the previous sections of this paper, it was assumed that there was a one-time
distribution of the objects to the participants (either deterministically or randomly).
This section addresses the situation when the same objects (or committee assign
ments, etc.) must be distributed to the same people repeatedly or periodically, and
assumes that their values do not change with time.
Definition 5.1. R(A,L,i) is the actual share received by person [(with value matrix
A) under lottery L, that is,
m

R(A,L,i)

L

=:

aijdji

j=1

on the set where D;; (dj ;) e Dm,n occurs.
Observe that R (A, L, i) is a uniformly bounded (values in [0, 1]) random variable
whose distribution depends on A and L, and that
E(R (A, L, i»

= V(A, L, i)

for all

i;; 1, ... , n.

Definition 5.2. Lotteries L l' L 2 , ••• are (mutually) independent if R (A, L It i),
R(A,L 2 ,i), ... are mutually independent for all i=l, ...• n.
The next theorem says that over time, a repeated use of a one-step optimal lottery
yields an average return which is always (i.e., with probability one) better than the
average return using any other sequence of lotteries, even ones which are history
dependent.
Theorem 5.3. Let QIt Q2, ... be independent copies of an (independent) lottery Q
which is optimal for A. and let L I. L 2 .... be a (possibly dependent) sequence of ar
bitrary lotteries. Then with probability one.
1

j

L R(A.Qkoi) =
j-oc isn J k=l
lim min-:-

VR(A)

1

j-oo

j

E R(A.Lf.;.i).
isn J k= I

~limsupmin-:-

Proof. For the equality, observe that {R(A, Qkt i)}:: I are uniformly bounded Li.d.
random variables with mean V(A, Q, i), so by the strong law of large numbers,
I )

1:

~
R(A,Qkti)~- V(A,Q,i)
J k= I

forall

i=I, ... ,n.

This implies
I

j

L

lim min~
)-CSJ

J k=

i~n

R(A,Qbi)a~-min {V(A,Q,i)}
i~n

1

= V(A,Q) = VR(A),

(since af/-+a, bn-+b implies min{an,bn}-min{a,b}).
For the inequality, consider first the case where the lotteries L1,L:!" ... are in
dependent. Define
Xk(i)

= R(A,Lkti)- V(A,Lk,i),

and observe that for each i, {Xk(i)}
zero random variables, so
I
lim ~
j-=

J

j

L

Xk(i)a~·O

r=

I

are uniformly bounded independent mean

for all

i.

(3)

k'= I

This implies
I )

limsupmin~

L

i~nJk=1

)-':XJ

I )

R(A,Lbi)ad-limsupmin~
)-00

L

V(A,Lkti)

i~nJk=1

for all

i = I, ... ,n.

(The inequality follows since for all j,
I )

min~

L

~_

V(A,Lkti) = min V(A,L,i) = V(A,L)::; VR(A),

i~nJk=1

i~n

where [=(L I + ... +L)/j.)
If L I ,L 2 , ••• are dependent, define
Xk(i)

= R(A, L kt i) -

E[R(A, L kt i)

13k - tl

for each

i = I, ... , n,

where 17k is the a-algebra generated by {R(A,L),i)}1=1' Observe that {Xdi)}r=1
is a uniformly bounded martingale difference sequence, so by the martingale strong
law of large numbers (Levy, 1937), (3) holds again and consequently
I )

lim sup min ~
)-00

i~n

J

I )

E R(A, L kt i) ad-lim sup min ~ E E[R(A, L k , i) 13k - II.

k=1

j-oo

isn J k=1

The conclusion then follows essentially as in the independent case, since
I )
min~
E[R(A,Lkti)
i~n

J

L

k=l

I 3 k -tl =

I
~
min~V(A,L,i),
i~n

J

(where [is the $)_I-measurable random lottery L=(L 1 + ... +L)/j) and since

mIniSn V(A,i(w),i)= V(A,i(w))s VR(A) for all w.
The next theorem is similar to Theorem 5.3, but weaker in the sense that the con
clusion is for expectations rather that pointwise convergence, and stronger in that
the conclusion holds for all j, not just in the limit.
Theorem 5.4. Let {Qd and {Ld be as in Theorem 5.3. Then for all j

minE[~ t
t:sn

R(A,Qkti)]

}k=1

= VR(A)~minE[~
IS"

t

~

I,

R(A,Lkti)].

}I.;=I

Proof. The equality follows since the random variables {R(A,Qk>i)}%,= I are Li.d.,
so
]
I j
I j
E -:R(A, Qkt i) = -:(E(R(A, Qkt i)] = V(A, Q, i)
[ }k=1
}k=1

L

L

and
min V(A,Q,i) = V(A,Q) = VR(A).
is n

For the inequality, let {i k }{= I be independent, with il.; having the same dis
tribution as LI.; for each k=I, ... ,j. Set i=(i 1 + ... +ij)/jE !l!(n,m) and ob
serve that

~ R(A,LI.;,i) ] = E[R(A,L,i)]
~
~
1 t..J
E [ -:= V(A,L,i)
} k= I

for all

isn,

so the conclusion follows since
min V(A, i, i)
i:s n

= V(A, i) s

VR(A).

::J

The final example points out that the order of the limit and minimization opera
tions in the conclusion of Theorem 5.3 is critical; if one considers the minimum of
the limit (superior) average reward rather than the limit of the minimum average
reward, then there is always a solution where periodically each person (at different
times) may be satisfied he has received the entire estate.
Example 5.5. Let {D;}7:J be the deterministic (and independent) lotteries in which
D; assigns all m objects to person i + I, and define the sequence of deterministic
(and independent) lotteries QI, Qz, ... as follows:
Qj =

D"(modn),

where

k = min{k: e

~j},

(i.e., QI=D 1 ; Qj=D z ,j=2,3,4; Qj=D),j=5,6, ... ,27; etc.).
Then it is easy to see that with probability one,
1
lim sup -:j-oo

j

E R (A, Qk, i) = 1
}k=1

for all i.
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